

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

PRESENTATION TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNEIL AND GENERAL MCNARNEY \*  
BY THE DIRECTOR, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY AT 1000, WEDNESDAY, 1 MARCH 1950  
IN ROOM 3E354, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUILDING

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS

1. I wish to mention a few of the basic JCS 2010 series of papers concerning the establishment and operation of AFSA. JCS 2010/6 contains the charter of the Armed Forces Security Agency Council, and also a directive to the Director concerning his responsibilities and functions. The Council's charter designates it as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with insuring the most effective operation of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), and delegates to the Council certain authority to act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff including the determination of policies, operating plans, and doctrines for AFSA. The Council recommends to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the facilities, personnel and fiscal and logistic support to be provided by the Services to AFSA -- basing such recommendations on the requirements as determined by the Director of AFSA.

2. The directive for the Director of the Armed Forces Security Agency contained in JCS 2010/6 required the Director to submit specific and detailed recommendations as to the initial composition, organization, and physical location of the major elements of AFSA. This initial requirement has been complied with and is contained in JCS 2010/10 and JCS 2010/11.

3. In performing his assigned functions, the Director, AFSA, has the following among his specific responsibilities:

a. Determination and submittal to AFSAC of AFSA requirements concerning personnel, facilities and fiscal and logistic support, together with specific recommendations of what the respective services shall supply in each category.

b. Coordination within the Department of Defense of individual Service cryptologic activities and those of AFSA, as necessary to insure the optimum degree of mutual support consistent with the effective conduct of such activities.

\* Note: Present at the conference besides the Director, AFSA, were Maj.Gen. C.P. Cabell, USAF, Brig.Gen. C.M. Myers, USAF, Mr. L.S. Garlock, Col. R.H. Lynn, USAF, Lt.Col. H.H. Towler, USAF and Cdr. J.W. Frorath, USN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS  
-----

4. The cryptologic responsibilities of the residual service activities generally are those required by the Services to maintain, during peacetime, their readiness to meet wartime operational requirements, and to operate during wartime, those facilities necessary for direct support of combat operations. Each Service has been directed to maintain the facilities and personnel required for the discharge of its basic responsibility in such activities. Each Service has been directed to keep the Director, AFSA, fully informed of the cryptologic activities of the individual Service -- especially in order that the Director may act to preclude unnecessary duplication of AFSA operations, and the unnecessary expenditure of funds.

5. Let me read a few extracts from the JCS 2010 series which bear directly on the relationship between AFSA and the cryptologic activities of the 3 Services: The Services individually will --

a. (From JCS 2010 - Appendix - para. 3d.(6)):

"Continue to be responsible for all such cryptologic activities as are required by intra-service or joint needs (e.g., communication intelligence processing, intercept, research and development, training, etc.) and are determined by the JCS not to be the sole responsibility of AFSA. They will at all times keep the Director, AFSA, fully informed concerning all such activities.

"(7) Not undertake or continue cryptologic activities which are determined by the JCS to be the sole responsibility of AFSA."

b. (From JCS 2010 - Appendix - para. 3d):

"The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will:

"(1) - - - - -

"(2) Provide fixed intercept installations as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such installations will be manned and administered by the Service providing them, but will be operationally directed by AFSA.

"(3) Provide mobile intercept facilities required by the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively, which will be manned, administered, and operationally controlled by the individual Service. They may also be used to perform special missions for AFSA as requested by the Director thereof"

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS

-----

c. (From JCS 2010/6 - Enclosure "B" - paras. 4 & 5):

"4. ----- the Director, AFSA, will have the following specific responsibilities:

"a. -----

"b. -----

"c. Coordination within the Department of Defense of individual Service cryptologic activities and those of AFSA as necessary to insure the optimum degree of mutual support consistent with the effective conduct of such activities.

"5.a. Responsibilities of the Services for the conduct of cryptologic activities, and restrictions thereon, are indicated in paragraph 3 d of JCS 2010. Generally, these responsibilities are those required by the Services to maintain, during peacetime, their readiness to meet their wartime operational requirements, and to operate, during wartime, those facilities necessary for direct support of combat operations. Specifically, these responsibilities are:

"(1) Intercept -- as indicated in JCS 2010.

"(2) Processing -- as needed for intercept control and for combat intelligence. Exploitation by each Service applies only to material of operational interest to that Service. Such exploitation outside AFSA will not entail undesirable duplication."

6. JCS 2010/10 indicates the initial components of AFSA as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This initial composition is obviously not an equitable arrangement -- which is understandable in view of the fact that the Air Force did not have a comparable organization to that maintained by the Army and by the Navy prior to the organization of AFSA. However, the ultimate plan for AFSA envisages an equal supply of the military personnel, both officer and enlisted, from each of the three Services.

7. JCS 2010/10 indicates both the components from each Service which are to be directly attached to AFSA, as well as the components which are operationally

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS

-----

controlled by AFSA, but which are manned and administered by the individual Service. The paper also includes the lists of residual Army, Navy and Air Force cryptologic activities with their geographical locations.

8. As the Air Force Security Service recruits within its allowed and contemplated spaces -- a problem requiring solution presents itself. Actually, this problem requiring solution based on JCS basic directives applies to all three Services, as well as AFSA. Actually, too, this problem is a collateral one and does not directly bear upon the approval or disapproval of the facilities now in question. General Cabell and I recognize that in resolving this problem, the stated and implied provisions of the JCS 2010 series must, of course, be adhered to, and the imperative need for maximum economy and efficiency must be kept in mind. It is difficult to state this complex problem simply. It involves such issues as --

a. How shall increases in the COMINT effort in support of a Service's primary military function be applied and controlled in peacetime for optimum effectiveness in both the discharge of that Service's responsibilities and the accomplishment of AFSA's assigned mission?

b. To what extent and where can the Services be permitted to undertake independent information-producing COMINT operations in peacetime, considering AFSA's present great dependence upon all authorized COMINT activities to meet AFSA responsibilities?

c. To what extent can AFSA continue to rely in peacetime upon employing and controlling both fixed and mobile intercept activities to meet its requirements so that the expense of establishing and maintaining additional fixed intercept facilities may be minimized?

d. How shall DIRAFSA exercise operational control of such fixed and mobile intercept activities as are allocated for AFSA use, in order to insure their most effective employment?

9. The Director, AFSA, expects to resolve these matters by conferring with Service representatives as soon as possible. In fact, the first such conference was held with the Army on Thursday, 16 February 1950. A similar conference

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS  
-----

was recently arranged with the Air Force for next week.<sup>#</sup> If resolution by this means should not prove feasible, however, a presentation will be made to AFSAC at an early date, with a view to settlement in AFSAC, where the machinery for such settlement is available.

10. Under the present SecDef and JCS directives, the Services are not only allowed but required to have certain cryptologic activities. The Army and Navy have them -- the Air Force is endeavoring to establish theirs. Additional COMINT facilities certainly are required. At a presentation of the Air Force program to AFSAC it was the consensus that the Air Force capability in the programmed field is necessary. AFSAC did not concern itself with types and locations of actual buildings. Studies have conclusively shown that a great deal more intercept coverage is essential -- especially on Russian air traffic. The Russian problem is especially complex due particularly to their security-mindedness, including rather general use for highest-level communications of one-time crypto systems for which there is no solution. This situation necessitates the interception and exploitation of a tremendous amount of lower level and plain language traffic. Fortunately, this will yield a vast amount of information. It, however, requires a large expansion of intercept personnel and skilled processing personnel -- especially cryptanalysts and linguists. If part of the Air Force expanded mobile facilities can be operationally directed by the Director, AFSA, much of the required additional intercept traffic could be obtained. The processing personnel probably will largely have to be recruited by AFSA in the civilian field. Essentially, the problem is to determine how Service activities may be operated within JCS directives and insure efficiency and economy.

11. Attention is invited also to the need of the Services for residual cryptographic activities, that is, Communications Security Activities. While AFSA is charged with producing all crypto-material and supervising Communications Security of the Armed Forces, the individual Services still distribute the crypto-material, account for it within each Service, do necessary cryptographic maintenance work, and monitor their own Communications circuits.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
# Subsequently was changed to week of 13 April, 1950

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.~~TOP SECRET~~

1 March 1950

SUBJECT: Relationship of AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Activities --  
particularly the AFSS  
-----

12. The individual Services also have to train certain of their cryptologic personnel. AFSA does certain specialized training for such personnel -- and establishes training programs and standards.

13. General Cabell will present the information you require concerning the Air Force Security Service.

*Earl E. Stone*EARL E. STONE  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency~~TOP SECRET~~